Foreign Policy Stuff 2

Here ia a paper that reflects on the second foreign obsession of thinking Indians (for the first see Foreign Policy stuff 1 post)

This one is also dated, written in 2003, and thankfully subsequent events have toned down some of the risks mentioned here, and the whole US India relationship has been substantially improved, nay transformed by Maryada Purushottam George W Bush Ji (on why I call him that I will explain in a later post).

A little caveat, I use the term realim here to denote enlightened national self interest, rather than any particular school of thought. In fact when I wrote this I was not aware that there are multiple theories of revolving around realism, with many variations. Frankly I find it tough to read too many theoretical books on such topics, so this is the opinion of an amateur observer only.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-4/nandv.html

Article Reviews

Building a New Partnership with India, Teresita Schaeffer, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2002 http://www.twq.com/02spring/schaffer.pdf

Teresita Schaffer deserves to be commended for writing a fairly comprehensive account of the major factors affecting Indo–US relations. She has made an accurate diagnosis of the variables that might affect the trajectory of this relationship and the challenges therein. She has refrained from making any major controversial suggestions on how US policy (or India’s policy) should be molded to accommodate the challenges.

At the very outset, she states that the US-India relationship cannot be an alliance but a selective partnership based on realism and candor, and based on specific areas of common interest. This is an accurate statement. An alliance between India and the US resembling the US-British relationship is not feasible. The natural and perceived interests of large civilization states often diverge. Due to the much stronger economic, military and diplomatic power of the US, such a relationship would only be possible with India assuming the position of a de facto vassal state, which its size and civilizational memory would not allow it to do.

Though realism is foreign affairs is an unquestionable truism, its importance in this context needs to be highlighted. Both states have been guilty of ignoring this principle. India adopted moralistic and sometimes reactionary anti-Americanism at times. Washington has been guilty of letting bilateral ties languish due to a distorted vision through a cold war prism, and a lack of sufficient understanding of and sensitivity towards India. Important areas of cooperation remained untapped due to Washington’s insistence on issues like nuclear non-proliferation, though it was simply beyond its power to undermine Indian consensus on the issue. Subsequent acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons by the US, and India’s strong (and lonely) support of the AMD program also indicates a welcome growing maturity on both sides.

The paper goes on to list important changes in India and Asia that affect the relationship, and is largely accurate in these assessments. These include the higher growth and size of the Indian economy. The greater interdependence between the Indian and US economies due to higher participation of multinationals in the Indian economy and the strong growth of the IT sector. The decline of the preeminence of the Congress Party and the era of the coalition politics is also mentioned.

India requires a broader range of relationships since it cannot depend on the strong political support of a weakened Russia. India is the predominant military power in the subcontinent and the largest military power between the Persian Gulf and East Asia, two major centers of US military presence. The prevailing situation opens up important areas of military cooperation. India’s overt nuclearization has also focused US interest in the area. It is a welcome development that US has matured its attitude to India’s nuclearization and India to greater US military presence in Asia.

The paper goes on to detail the importance of Indian economic growth, the ideology and dynamics of major political groups, internal economic situation, and the dynamics of India’s interests and relations with other countries, to the Indo US relationship.

An important assertion that Schaffer makes is that US should accommodate India into the club of nations that manage the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is a welcome suggestion since India’s record on non-proliferation is superior to acknowledged Nuclear Weapon states such as China. The denial of NWS status makes little difference to the ground realities, and is an unnecessary irritant. The other important policy suggestions are increased military and economic cooperation in the Persian Gulf and Asia Pacific region.

The paper rejects the possibility of an anti-China axis between the US and India as impractical, and makes reasonable and valid arguments for the same.

The denial of critical defense and dual use technologies by the US to India is a major irritant in bilateral ties. The decline of the Russian armament supplies to India opens opportunities to expand the defense trade between the two countries. However the paper refrains from suggesting any changes in US policy on the issue.

Schaffer succeeds in identifying the fundamental difference in worldview between the two countries. While the US interest is to consolidate its role as the world’s sole superpower, India desires an increasingly multipolar world with itself as a major pole. The shadow of Indo-Pakistan tension over Kashmir looms large over the relationship. While the diagnosis is accurate, the prognosis is vague and unclear. The paper suggests a “sustained and sophisticated US diplomatic strategy” to defuse the situation. There is very little in terms of policy suggestion. Though the paper does suggest that Pakistan has to be pressured to stop cross border terrorism, it qualifies this assertion by saying that it might be difficult to persuade Pakistan to do the same.

Unfortunately, this single issue has the potential to overshadow all other recent positive developments and opportunities. The failure (or reluctance) of the US to force Pakistan’s hand on the terrorism issue is an overriding factor in the minds for the Indian establishment. This fact, coupled with the acknowledged difference in worldviews, and the denial of critical defense technologies suggest a strategy of containment against India. The motives of the US in this regard are irrelevant, since there is a growing view among the Indian security establishment of Pakistan as a US (and Chinese) client state to contain India.

For Indians, the acknowledgement of Pakistan as a “frontline ally against terrorism” is a ludicrous ‘Alice in Wonderland’ scenario. From India’s point of view, the US has been guilty of disregarding India’s legitimate concerns over terrorism, and equating the aggressor and victim by hyphenating its relationship with India and Pakistan.

Though the imperative for an alliance with Pakistan can be justified and understood as a tactical necessity, the opacity of US intentions towards Iraq, and its inconsistent stand towards WMD and nuclear technology transfers vis-à-vis North Korea and China is viewed negatively in India. The perception of India as “Morality without Strength” is reciprocated with a perception of the US as “Strength without Morality”. This is an unfortunate scenario that should be addressed by both countries at the diplomatic level, even if overall geopolitical policies remain unchanged.

The danger is that the success of present US policy is predicated to an acceptance of the status quo from India. If India decides to disregard US concerns and assurances, takes a proactive approach and precipitates direct military action against Pakistan, the entire edifice of US foreign policy in the region would come crumbling down.

Support for the military option has been growing steadily in India, with major provocative events such as the Kargil War of 1999, 9/11 and the attack on the Indian Parliament in Dec 2001. Some terrorist groups have been displaying increasing autonomy in their actions, sometimes defying the will of Islamabad. With Indians losing faith in Pakistani assurances and American guarantees, a major attack such as the one on Parliament would make the military option politically imperative, especially if a government with weak nationalist credentials is in power, the threat of nuclear escalation notwithstanding.
In conclusion, the paper is lucidly written and an important and comprehensive account of the gamut of factors affecting the US and India bilateral relationship. However its use as a policy paper is limited since it does not venture any major innovations in policy by either country.