Foreign policy stuff

It is said that the thinking Indian has 3 foreign obsessions - Pakistan, PRC and the US. Of these, US and Pakistan are well understood due to deep cultural and/or historical ties, while PRC remains largely unknown (to most).

I tried to summarise my thoughts on the known obsessions in a couple of review articles that contain a distillation of what I have read and experienced ove the years. The primary reason for writing review papers rather than new papers is to escape the necessity of indexing a bibliography which takes 4 times as much time as writing a short paper.

The following is a review of a paper by Stephen Cohen "The Nation and the State of Pakistan". It was written in 2002, but is still largely applicable.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-1/nandv.html

The Nation and the State of Pakistan

Stephen Phillip Cohen, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2002, pp 109-122.

Steven Philip Cohen is a prominent South Asia “expert”. It may be pertinent to note at the outset that there are no prominent US experts in India or South Asia experts in the United Kingdom. The prominence of individual experts is a phenomenon that arises only when there is a lack of understanding among the decision-making intelligentsia of another country or region. Therefore individuals like Cohen have significant influence on US policy for the decision makers are dependent to an extent on their input.

Cohen provides a largely accurate narrative of the short history of Pakistan and its current sociopolitical environment. His fundamental premise is that Pakistan is too large a state to be allowed to fail.

However his paper contradicts itself at many points. These contradictions are consistent with the inherent contradictions of the idea of Pakistan itself. It will be difficult for any scholar to remain consistent and argue against the failure of Pakistan. For a state to be saved from failure, it is necessary that it should not have failed already. Cohen defines state failure as a country where security, human services, justice and basic necessities are not provided. He also says that the ideological failure is a subjective and contentious topic, and thereby skirts the problematic issue. It is implicit in these statements that Cohen believes ideological failure is distinct from institutional failure. In other words a nation can exist and succeed in an ideological vacuum. He fails to address the fundamental question of how a state can exist without an identity for its citizens or a raison d’etre. Nor does he suggest any mechanism for forging a new Pakistani identity. In fact he is extremely despondent about that occurring in the foreseeable future.

Cohen’s idea of Pakistan:

Cohen states that Pakistan was created to protect Muslims from intolerance and bigotry of the Hindu majority. And to serve as a “beacon” for oppressed Muslims around the world. He draws an analogy with the state of Israel. It is a tenuous analogy.

It is not clear how Indian Muslims suffered intolerance and bigotry from India’s Hindu majority akin to what the Jews suffered around the world. After all unlike Jews, Muslims were well represented in the armed forces, judiciary and the bureaucracy in British India, and had strong organized political associations. At worst there was an apprehension of intolerance from the Hindu majority in an independent India. It is also unclear how Cohen gets the idea that Pakistan was to serve as a “beacon” for oppressed Muslims around the world. Unlike Israel Pakistan does not allow oppressed Muslims to seek refuge in Pakistan. Cohen makes no attempt to explain this assertion. The only statement he makes is that Pakistan aspired to be a leader of Islamic states. There is nothing extraordinary or laudatory about this ambition. Every state of substantial size aspires for global leadership and great power status. Also Israel apart from being a Jewish homeland is also an immigrant state. The immigrant adopts Israel as his country, Hebrew as his language and gradually assimilates into an Israeli identity. The Pakistani still defines his identity from his linguistic, regional, religious (Islamic) sect, and tribal affiliations. The events of 1971 and subsequent political movements in Sindh, Balochistan, NWFP and the Mohajir movement have amply demonstrated this.

Cohen accepts that the fundamental premise behind the creation of Pakistan was the Two Nation Theory that states Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations that cannot live together.

After the creation of Bangladesh it was clear that Islam alone couldn’t be the binding factor for a linguistically and ethnically diverse people such as the subcontinent’s Muslims. As long as India exists and matures into an increasingly prosperous and liberal state, and India’s Muslims continue to thrive and prosper in a democratic secular India, in a largely peaceful if occasionally fractious relationship with the Hindu majority, there is no justification for Pakistan to exist. The present day Pakistan is just the antithesis of India. Continuous conflict with India is its only source of unity.

Cohen seems to be mesmerized by what he claims was Jinnah’s vision of a liberal, democratic and moderate homeland for ‘some of India’s Muslims’. He also suggests that it is because of the fact that Pakistan has drifted away from Jinnah’s vision that it has come to its present sorry state. He does not recognize that Jinnah himself was unable to provide a liberal and democratic setup for Pakistan in his lifetime. His insistence on the imposition of Urdu as the national language on Bengalis and other linguistic minorities cannot be condoned as a democratic move. Cohen refuses to acknowledge that the Two Nation theory is in fundamental conflict with the principles of liberty and democracy.

In the later chapters of the report, Cohen’s definition of state failure seems to change to one of territorial integrity, rather than the security and welfare of its citizens. His main argument against disintegration of Pakistan is that it could cause unforeseen calamities to the entire region, and the nuclear weapons could be lost to rogue states or terrorist elements. However Cohen himself acknowledges that Pakistan is unlikely to change it policy of a hopeless vendetta against India in Kashmir and elsewhere. In other words he finds sustained terrorism against India as an acceptable price for some unforeseen threats that might emerge from Pakistan’s disintegration. He ignores various polls in Pakistan by multinational agencies that most Pakistanis prioritize economic growth, education, civic amenities and governance above Kashmir as a national priority. In doing so, he accepts the Pakistani Army’s stance on Kashmir as representative of the people of Pakistan. The Kashmir mission is undoubtedly a necessity for the Army to legitimize its hold to power.

Cohen then gives a vague recommendation that US must keep assisting Pakistan and build its institutions. He also suggests that US should attempt to bolster education, and counter propaganda against India, and against the US and its allies. He does not provide further details on the mechanism for this policy. It can be assumed that he proposes US support for the dispensation in power, i.e., the Pakistani Army to this end. Here he contradicts his own statement that the Army would not be willing to change anti-India policies.

In conclusion Cohen presents a good primer about the history of Pakistan and the prevailing social and political situation. He also provides a good background in Pakistan’s ideological moorings and the problems therein. However his only policy recommendation seems to be the continuation of the status quo, with peripheral modifications. There is no road map for his personal objective of a moderate, modern, Muslim state. It is possible that he does not recognize the inherent fallacy of the Two Nation Theory for he seems to be a believer himself. His policy suggestions do not attack the fundamental problems with Pakistan. The term ‘appeasement’ immediately comes to mind. It seems to lack the vision or courage to suggest a proactive policy that would defuse the threats the present incarnation of Pakistan presents to the world at large, and India and the US in particular.